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STRATEGIES IN WATER QUALITY CONTROL
WILLIAM E. McFARLANDtt
Water quality control programs commonly consist of two parts.
The first is to determine as public policy the desired quality of a
body of water. The second is to implement the policy.
The following article dwells on the second part, comparing three
strategies for achieving a pre-determined water quality. The three
strategies considered are (1) a system of waste discharge quotas
(often called "standards"),' (2) effluent charges,2 and (3) a waste
discharge permits market (sometimes called a "pollution rights"
market).' In contrast to the stationary setting of many treatments of
this problem, this article gives particular attention to how these
strategies may handle several sources of change that any control
program is likely to confront.
Each of the strategies operates through a waste discharge permit
system that possesses many common features. These common
features are treated first. Then a standard version for each strategy is
considered, allowing differences among the versions only when required by the conceptual differences in the strategies.
THE WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD
Assume a Water Quality Control Board receives a mandate to attain and maintain a target quality for a public body of water.4 The
Board is to achieve the target quality or better within five years.
The Board is empowered to control all waste discharges from nondispersed, stationary sources, both public and private. It has no control, however, over dispersed sources of waste such as run-off. Within
the Board's jurisdiction, no waste can be discharged legally into the
body of water without a permit that specifies the maximum rate of
t am indebted to Blair T. Bower for many helpful comments.
ttAssistant Professor of Economics, University of North Carolina.
1. The Delaware River Basin Commission incorporates many of the features attributed in
the present paper to the discharge quota system. See A. Kneese and B. Bower, Managing
Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions 274-281 (1968).
2. Senator William Proxmire has proposed the introduction of effluent charges as a water
quality control strategy. See 115 Cong. Rec. 35724-35729 (1969) (Debates on S. Bill 3181,
The Regional Water Quality Act of 1970).
See also in Kneese and Bower, supra note 1, at 131-42.
3. A system similar to the permits market strategy considered here is described in J.
Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices 93-100 (1968).
The system described by T. Ferrar and A. Whinston, Taxation and Water Pollution
Control, 12 Natural Resources J. 307 (1972), is similar to Dales' system, but has a much larger
information requirement.
4. The body of water might be of any type, i.e., a lake or river, so long as the major sources
of waste were stationary and non-dispersed.
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discharge allowed the holder. The Board controls total discharge by
limiting the permits issued.
A. Common tasks
The Board has several tasks it must perform in any strategy it
attempts. First, it must construct a set of water quality indicators
consistent with the specifications of its mandate, and determine the
degrading agents. This assumes that a suitable index of water quality
is available and that there is only one degrading agent, "waste."
The body of water is divided into "quality regions" sufficiently
small that a given rate of waste discharge has the same impact on
water quality, regardless of its location within a region. The waste
discharge permits are region-specific, i.e., a permit applicable to one
region cannot be used for discharges in another. The subsequent
discussion deals with the Board's control of pollution of a single quality
region.
The Board must establish a monitoring system, either periodic or
continuous, to assure compliance of discharges with the permit
limitations. The Board also needs a system for monitoring water
quality.
From an estimated relationship between waste discharges and
water quality, the Board obtains a maximum total rate of discharges
consistent with the target water quality. By subtracting a projected
rate of discharges from uncontrolled sources, the Board establishes a
"target discharge rate," i.e., the estimated maximum rate of discharge from controlled sources consistent with the target water
quality.
B. Sources of change
The Board faces one certainty; it will operate under conditions of
constant change. These changes may affect (1) the target discharge
rate applicable to any given target water quality, (2) the costminimizing allocation of permits among potential waste dischargers,
and (3) the target water quality mandate of the Board.
1. Target discharge rate. The target discharge rate is subject to
revision as the Board becomes aware of changes in three basic determinants. First, the Board may acquire an improved estimate of the
waste-discharge-to-water-quality relationship. The continuing controversy over the role of phosphates in the eutrophication of lakes
should be a sufficient reminder of the uncertainty on this count.
Second, there may be unpredicted changes in uncontrolled sources.
This source of change may be particularly important in agricultural
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regions. Third, the waste assimilative capacity of the water body may
be altered by changes in such factors as the construction of new
dams, the policies governing existing water impoundments, and the
amount of dredging or silting. Changes in any of these factors, and
others, will alter the basic relationship between the rate of waste
discharge and water quality.
2. Cost-minimizing allocation of permits. One of the primary
criteria for evaluating control strategies is the cost of attaining any
given water quality. All else being equal, the cost-minimizing strategy
is preferred. Any change in conditions that might change the costminimizing allocation of permits therefore constitutes a change to be
reckoned with. Such changes may come from a variety of sources,
e.g., increased industrialization or urbanization of the neighboring
land, changes in product mix and production technologies, or
changes in waste treatment technologies. These matters are discussed
in more detail in a later section.
3. The mandate. Although we may hope that changes in the
Board's mandate (i.e., the target water quality) are infrequent, this is
a contingency the Board may confront. The demand for water resources, both for waste disposal and other uses. Recreation, for instance, is in constant flux. The target water quality of today may
seem inappropriate tomorrow.
Our attitude toward the strategies should depend in large measure
on how they are able to cope with changing conditions.
EVALUATION CRITERIA
Criteria for evaluating the strategies include (1) cost, (2) equity,
(3) ease of enforcement, and (4) generation of revenue. An important fifth consideration that cannot be properly treated with the
present general framework is the impact of the st-ategies on the
distribution of welfare, i.e., the incidence of the costs and benefits of
the strategies.
A. Cost
Other things being equal, the preferred strategy is that which
minimizes the cost of achieving the target water quality. The total
cost consists of two parts; the "abatement costs" incurred by
potential waste dischargers and the "administrative costs" incurred
by the Board. Consider first the abatement costs.
1. Abatement costs. A necessary condition for the minimization
of abatement costs is that all polluters have the same marginal cost of
abatement, i.e., that the cost of reducing the rate of discharge by one
unit be the same for all polluters. Otherwise, the cost of obtaining a
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given water quality can be reduced by the low marginal abatement
cost polluter reducing his discharges by some amount and the high
marginal abatement cost polluter increasing his discharges by the
same amount. The total rate of discharges remains unchanged, but
the resource cost of abatement is lower.'
In considering the cost of abatement, it is important to differentiate between waste "abatement" and waste "treatment." Treatment is but one form of abatement. Other important, though less
visible, forms of abatement reduce the total amount of waste generated.
For example, a firm may change its product-mix, shifting output
from high waste-generating goods to low waste-generating goods. Or
it may reduce the waste generated by changing the production
processes by the use of higher quality inputs, the introduction of
re-cycling processes, or the use of techniques that do the same job
but either generate less waste or make the waste generated easier to
treat or re-cycle.
Each of these forms of abatement generally increase the cost of
production. Often, they also complicate the task of determining net
abatement costs by changing the nature of the good produced. For
example, higher quality inputs may improve product quality. The net
increase in abatement cost is then something less than the increased
input cost.
2. Administrative costs. Three aspects of administrative costs are
important-the costs of (1) collecting and processing the information
required for the Board's operations, (2) enforcing the Board's decisions, and (3) making non-routine decisions.
B. Other criteria
1. Equity. Questions of equity are easier raised than resolved.
What a person considers "fair" often depends on where he is standing. The less ambiguous the criteria for allocating the permits, however, the less frequent should be the claims of unfair and arbitrary
treatment. There is also a probable consensus that the Board should
be isolated from political pressures and economic threats.
2. Ease of enforcement. In addition to the role of enforcement in
determining administrative costs, ease of enforcement may affect the
success of the Board in achieving the target water quality on
schedule. Enforcement is also related to the question of equity, since
5. We ignore here complications that may arise if important economies of scale are
present in the abatement efforts of potentially large dischargers. The presence of this
situation in a quality region may require its treatment as a special case. See Kneese and
Bower, supra note 1, at 137-38.
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a strategy that produces few claims of "unfair treatment" (justified
or not) will generally be easier to enforce.
3. Revenues. The effluent charge and permits market strategies
generate revenue for the Board from polluters proportional to the
rates of waste discharge. The discharge quota strategy would probably be financed by some combination of licensing fees (not proportional to discharges) and general tax revenues.
The charge and market systems might therefore be favored on the
groupd that the Board is an acting trustee of a common property
resource and should receive revenues from the parties responsible for
the degradation of the resource in proportion to the amount of
degradation.
This position might be contested by those who feel that polluters
have established "prior rights" to pollution by their past practices.
Ferrar and Whinston appear to hold this position.6 It is difficult to
see the basis for the position, however, since there are few, if any
cases in which the courts have recognized a "right-to-pollute" strictly
on the basis of prior behavior. Free use of a public resource that
results in degradation of that resource may be a privilege; it is certainly not a right.
No more will be said of the revenue question.
THREE STRATEGIES
A. Discharge quotas-mechanics
With the discharge quota strategy, the Board allocates the target
rate of waste discharge among applicant polluters on the basis of
such factors as the cost of abatement, "technological feasibilities,"
and (probably) political pressures. Each applicant receives a permit
to discharge waste up to some maximum rate for each of the next
five years, with the total maximum rates of all applicants consistent
with the target rate of discharge in the fifth year.
It is likely that a portion of the target rate of discharge (i.e., 10
percent) would initially be held in reserve as a contingency against
increased urbanization and industrialization (with the associated applications for waste discharge permits), and as a hedge against
revisions in the target rate of discharge.
Once the contingency reserve has been exhausted, the Board must
either (1) place a moratorium on further discharge increases, (2)
allow "over-runs" (i.e., violate its mandate), or (3) modify previously
allocated quotas. in any event, the Board must repeat the entire
6. Ferrar and Whinston, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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allocation process periodically, simply to maintain the target water
quality beyond the first five years.
B. Discharge quotas-evaluation
How does the discharge quota strategy fare by our four criteria? In
general, it fares poorly. The cost of achieving any target water
quality will probably be high, relative to either of the alternative
strategies. It is also likely to have more questions about its equity
and more enforcement difficulties.
1. Cost. It is not clear that minimization of the resource cost of
obtaining the target water quality would be the primary criterion for
allocation of the permits. If it is, however, the Board confronts a
two-edged sword. Any increase in its effort to minimize abatement
costs requires an increase in the information collection and processing component of administrative costs. Thus, as abatement costs fall,
administrative costs rise.
The search for the necessary abatement cost data is likely to become very costly as the Board proceeds from treatment to other
abatement data. Although the applicant polluters may have ready
access to the data, they may consider much of it confidential and be
resistant to its release. The Board can, within limits, generate much
of the data independent of applicant sources, but only at a substantial cost.
We must also remember that the Board is attempting to minimize
these costs over a five year period during which substantial technological change will occur. The Board faces a formidable task as it
attempts to lower abatement costs.
Administrative costs are also likely to be high. As noted above,
efforts to reduce abatement costs increase the information costs of
the Board's operations. Additional administrative costs are also incurred each time the Board determines quotas for future years
(beyond the initial five years) and each time it must modify past
quota allocations. In a sense, every allocation decision made by the
Board is non-routine.
Finally, enforcement costs may be high for reasons given below.
2. Other criteria. Beyond attempting to minimize costs, the basis
for allocating quotas is unclear. In the absence of unambiguous
criteria, the allocations have an air of arbitrariness that may beg for
charges of unfair treatment. It places a premium on the ability of
interested parties to articulate their positions and makes the Board
more vulnerable to political pressures.
Also, efforts to reduce total abatement costs may cause the Board
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to reward inefficient polluters with high discharge quotas at the expense of those who have managed to attain low treatment costs.
The Board thus faces the possibility of a firm or municipality
fighting the quota given it on the grounds that it has received "unfair
treatment," can meet the quota only at a "prohibitive cost" (possibly forcing a firm to shut-down or relocate), or that the quota is
"technologically impossible" to meet. If the Board modifies the
quota, other polluters are encouraged to contest their quotas. If the
Board takes legal action to obtain compliance, a prolonged court
fight may result. Regardless of the outcome, whether settled in court
or out, the contested quota absorbs costly resources of both parties.
C. Effluent charges-mechanics
The basic concept of effluent charges is simple. The Board establishes a price, or "effluent charge," for the waste discharge permits
proportional to the maximum permitted rate of discharge, say, ten
cents per pound per day. Once the Board has established a price, the
individual applicant determines his permitted rate of discharge.
The individual dischargers are then paying for the use of a common property resource, the public body of water, and may be expected to respond to its price the same as they respond to the prices
of other resources such as labor. The higher the price, the less of the
resource used. Confronted with a higher price for the use of the
waste assimilative capacity of the water, many polluters will find it
less costly to reduce the rate of waste discharge by using some combination of the forms of abatement described earlier such as changes
in product mix, production processes, and waste treatment.
The Board might base the initial charge on estimates of abatement
cost functions of the major polluters, estimated waste treatment cost
functions (recognizing that abatement costs never exceed waste treatment costs and are normally less), or (moving to smaller information
requirements) cost estimates of "typical" operations. The Board may
use a questionnaire survey of the potential applicants as supplementary data, asking how much they would discharge at various
effluent charges.
The effluent charge is then adjusted, perhaps annually, in the
direction required to move water quality toward the target level.
These adjustments take into account changes in any factors affecting
water quality, changes in the mandated target water quality, and
changes in factors (such as the level of industrial activity) that might
influence the demand for the permits. Note that the Board can respond directly to movements in water quality. Errors in the estimation of the target discharge rate raise fewer problems for this strategy
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than for strategies that must respond more directly toward the target
waste discharge rate.
D. Effluent charges-evaluation
How does the effluent charge strategy fare by our four criteria? In
general, it fares well. The costs of achieving the target water quality
should be relatively low, the strategy raises few questions of equity,
and there should be relatively few enforcement problems.
1. Cost. Abatement costs are minimized. Each firm faces the
alternatives of abating waste discharges or purchasing permits for
discharge at a price common to all polluters. Choosing the less costly
alternative, each polluter should increase abatement until the
marginal cost of abatement equals the effluent charge. In this manner, the marginal costs of abatement of all polluters are equated and
total abatement costs minimized. As conditions change, polluters
continue to adjust abatement in such a manner that the cost of
achieving any given water quality is minimized.
The same cost-saving incentive will produce decreasing rates of
discharge (even with a constant effluent charge), as polluters search
for new production and waste treatment technologies that lower
their total waste handling costs.
The administrative costs of the strategy should also be relatively
small. The major information costs are incurred to establish the
initial effluent charge. These costs need not be large (relative to other
strategies) so long as the initial effluent charge is considered truly
initial, subject to change as information increases and basic conditions change. No thought should be entertained (silently or aloud)
that the Board is able or needs to fine tune a "right price," with its
connotations of permanence.'
If it is recognized by all that periodic adjustments in the charge
will be made as needed to achieve the desired improvement in water
quality (regardless of whether they are precipitated by improvements
in our knowledge of basic determinants or by changes in those basic
7. Ferrar and Whinston seem overly concerned about the possible effects of economic
growth on the operation of the effluent charge strategy. Ferrar and Whinston, supra note 3.
They apparently see the Board continually one year late in its efforts to maintain the target
quality, as its failure to anticipate economic growth causes the rate of discharge always to be
excessive by 5 percent or so.
In addition to attributing virtually no anticipatory capacity to the Board, this concern
attaches an exaggerated precision to estimates of the target rate of discharge. Our knowledge
does not allow specification of water quality characteristics and their effects so precisely
that fluctuations of 5 percent or so in the waste discharge rate are normally of measurable
consequence.
See Fed. Water Pollution Control Ad., Dep't of the Interior, Report of the Committee on
Water Quality Criteria (1968) (Washington, D.C., G.P.O.).
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determinants), these adjustments should be relatively routine. In contrast to the discharge quota strategy, virtually all decisions in the
effluent charge strategy are routine. As we shall see, enforcement
costs should also be lower.
2. Other critiera. With effluent charges, the efficient abater is
rewarded by lower payments to the Board for discharge permits. The
inefficient abater pays a price for his inefficiency. Also, since the
effluent charge is the same for all polluters, it is difficult for one of
the polluters to cry "unfair treatment." The same feature decreases
the vulnerability of the Board to public relations and political
pressures.
Finally, under the discharge quota strategy, there was the potential
problem of a firm fighting its quota on the grounds of "technological
impossibility" or "prohibitive cost." With the effluent charge strategy,
there can be no appeal to technological impossibility. The decision of
an individual firm to abate or discharge belongs to the firm. Likewise,
the appeal to prohibitive costs would seldom sound authentic, since
effluent charges paid should represent a relatively small addition to
total costs. Enforcement problems will not disappear with effluent
charges, but they should be substantially less than those associated
with the discharge quota strategy.
E. Waste discharge permits market-mechanics
With our final strategy, the Board establishes a schedule of
maximum discharge rates for each of the next five years, with the
rate in the fifth year being the target rate of discharges (the
maximum rate estimated to be consistent with the target water
quality). This schedule of total discharge rates is identical to the one
used in the discharge quota strategy.
Instead of allocating total permitted discharges among the polluters as free quotas, however, the Board establishes a market in
transferable discharge permits. One way to establish the market is for
the Board to hold an initial auction for the permits applicable to the
first five years, followed by annual auctions to add to the market the
supply of permits for the twelve-month period five years distant.
Since the permits are transferable, a market in the permits also operates outside of the Board's auctions.
With a market in discharge permits, a firm chooses the least-cost
method of handling its waste problem; either abating or buying permits with terms of one to five years for discharge into public waters.
In some discussions, it would seem that little more need be said
about the mechanics of the permits market. J. H. Dales summarizes:
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Such markets would automatically set the correct level of pollu-

tion charge... and would also automatically, and continuously, adjust the level of the charge to take account of economic growth.
He sees "a simple market that can be operated by three or four
people and a small staff of stenographers to register purchases and
sales." '
. Such might be the case, provided two conditions are satisfied:
(1)
the permits market approximates a perfectly competitive market (in
particular, that all participants are small, relative to the market), and
(2) the target rate of waste discharges for any year remains constant
once it has been established.
It is unlikely, however, that the target rate of discharges can be set
with certainty several years (three to five) in advance. Changes are
likely from the many sources previously cited, and the Board needs
some provision for handling them. One provision might be a contingency reserve of permits, say, 10 percent of the total, held off the
market by the Board to meet unexpected developments. But a contingency reserve is no more the whole answer here than with the
discharge quota strategy. Another provision might be for the Board
to enter the market as a buyer. Entry by the Board, however, may
force significant increases in the price of permits, raising questions of
"excess profits" for the sellers and issues of equity for new market
entrants during periods of a contracting supply of permits.
Nor can we assume, a priori, that the market will approximate
perfect competition. Two forces will work toward creating imperfect
conditions. First, the permits are region-specific. This feature may
significantly narrow the scope of the market. (Permits applicable to
Lake Superior will be of little use to a firm wanting to build a new
plant on Lake Michigan). Second, once purchased, many of the permits will be associated with long-term investment decisions in basic
patterns of production and waste treatment. In the short-term the
holders of these permits will be relatively price insensitive.
Thus, at any given time only a small portion of the total supply of
permits will be sensitive to changes in their price. The direct result is
a strong possibility of monopolistic elements in the market. These
features may be especially troublesome to a potential new firm in a
region that must acquire permits for some minimum rate of waste
discharge. When the new firm tells the Board that it cannot acquire
the needed permits or can acquire them only at "exorbitant" prices,
how should the Board respond?
At least some of the proponents of a permits market strategy
8. Dales, supra note 3, at 100.
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evidence concern over the operation of an unattended market. Dales
sees the Board acting "like a 'specialist' on organized stock exchanges" to guard against sudden changes in the price of permits. 9
Although Dales does not describe the source of this potential problem, the most plausible reason for unstable permit prices is a narrow
market. Given his comment about the market being operated by
"three or four people and a small staff of stenographers," however,
the problem does not really trouble him.
Ferrar and Whinston show concern for the speed of adjustment of
a free market. They feel that "the complexity of the information
involved ... would tend to inhibit effective communication among

participants." To remedy this flaw, Ferrar and Whinston would give
the Board the task of "centralized coordination." The information
requirements of their proposed mechanism, however, appear quite
similar to those of the discharge quota strategy, since they have the
Board estimating the waste treatment cost functions of all major
polluters. In their discussion, they fail to distinguish between waste
treatment and waste abatement costs, thereby seriously underestimating the information requirements of their system.' 0
Both discussions dismiss quite lightly these market difficulties,
with virtually no justification, and they fail to even address several
problems the Board might expect to confront. How serious would
these problems be, and how might the Board deal with them? We
don't know. More research, both conceptual and empirical, is needed
before the permits market can be fairly evaluated as a control
strategy.
F. Waste dischargepermits market-evaluation
How does the permits market fare by our four criteria? Its performance depends critically upon the nature of the market.
1. Cost. Under perfectly competitive market conditions, the
abatement cost of attaining any given water quality is minimized. To
the extent that monopolistic elements exist in the market, however,
the marginal cost of obtaining permits is likely to be greater than the
price of the permits, and the marginal gain from selling a permit less
than its price. With this divergence, it is unlikely that the marginal
abatement costs of all polluters will be equal. Thus, under imperfect
market conditions, abatement costs are not minimized.
Likewise, if the permits market operates smoothly and changes in
the target discharge rate are minor, administrative costs should be
close to those of the effluent charge strategy. Lacking these ideal
conditions, administrative costs of the permits market strategy are
9. Dales, supra note 3, at 93-95.
10. Ferrar and Whinston, supra note 3, at 12-14.
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likely to be greater. The Board needs additional mechanisms for
decreasing the total supply of permits, and for evaluating the performance of the market and interfering if it decides the market is not
behaving "properly." These are new enterprises for the Board, involving non-routine decisions, and could result in substantial additions to administrative costs.
Given conditions of change and market imperfections, the cost of
achieving the target water quality with a permits market strategy
could be significantly higher than needed with the effluent charge
strategy.
2. Other critiera. If the market operates smoothly, its equity and
enforcement characteristics should be similar to those of the effluent
charge strategy. Each occasion of market intervention by the Board,
however, is accompanied by potential problems of both equity and
enforcement. It is even conceivable that these problems could be as
serious as those encountered with the discharge quota strategy.' 1
CONCLUSIONS
The differences among the strategies are almost non-existant in a
stationary world with perfect competition and costless information.
This is hardly an accurate description of the world in which we
operate, however. The problems associated with the discharge quota
strategy are very evident in a setting of changing conditions with
imperfect and costly information. The discharge quota strategy is
inferior by each of the criteria considered.
The permits market strategy does better, especially if one is
selective in the complications allowed to enter the picture. Thus, if it
is assumed that no revisions of the target rate of discharge will be
necessary and that permits market will sufficiently approximate perfect competition, the market strategy does well on nearly every
count. But revisions in the target rate of discharge probably will be
necessary, and we have reasons to expect problems to arise in the
operation of the market. Although the seriousness of these difficulties is not known, they cast significant doubt on the merits of a
permits market as a general control strategy.
In a changing and imperfect world, there can be no ideal strategy
for all situations. The low information requirements of the effluent
charges system and its ability to react to a broad class of changing
conditions appear to rank effluent charges as the superior control
strategy in a wide range of situations.
11. There is a strong similarity between the case cited earlier of a firm protesting its
discharge quota on the grounds that it involves prohibitive costs or is technologically infeasible, and the case of a firm that cannot acquire in the market permits for some minimum
rate of discharge, or can do so only at an exorbitant cost.

